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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Daniel E. Marmentini appeals from the Judgment of Conviction, Suspended 
Sentence and Order of Probation entered upon his conviction for felony driving under 
the influence. On appeal, M. Marmentini asserts that he was deprived of his due 
process right to a fair trial based on objected-to prosecutorial misconduct. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
This case began when Mr. Marmentini approached Corporal Mark Otter of the 
Boise County Sheriff's Department and asked for directions. (Tr., p.133, L.13 - p.135, 
L.4.) Corporal Otter smelled the odor of alcohol coming from Mr. Marmentini, and 
suspected that Mr. Marmentini may have been driving while under the influence of 
alcohol. (Tr., p.135, L.4 - p.136, L.11.) Corporal Otter had Mr. Marmentini perform field 
sobriety tests, on which he purportedly performed poorly, 1 and he was arrested for 
driving under the influence (hereinafter, DU I). (Tr., p.165, L.19 - p.166, L.4.) A breath 
alcohol test was administered using a Lifeloc machine with results of .224 and .225. 
(Tr., p.186, L.23 - p.187, L.1.) 
Mr. Marmentini's driving under the influence charge was elevated to a felony 
because his breath alcohol test was .20 or higher, and he had been convicted of driving 
1 Corporal Otter testified that, on the horizontal gaze nystagmus (hereinafter, HGN) test, 
"two points is a failure." (Tr., p.160, L.8.) He also testified that Mr. Marmentini did not 
pass the HGN test, but did not specify how many points he displayed. (Tr., p.164, Ls.6-
13.) Inexplicably, defense counsel did not challenge Corporal Otter's incorrect 
testimony; four points (or clues) must be present for a person to fail the HGN test. See 
People v. McKown, 924 N.E.2d 941, 952 (Ill. 2010) ("[A]n individual may fail the HGN 
test by showing 4 or more clues despite a blood-alcohol concentration below the legal 
limit for driving."); State v. Commins, 850 A.2d 1074, 1077 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) ("A 
finding of four clues indicates failure of the test and is a sign of intoxication."). 
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under the influence (excessive alcohol concentration) within the preceding five years. 
(R., pp.36-37.) Mr. Marmentini's case proceeded to a jury trial. During closing 
arguments, defense counsel objected to several statements and arguments made by 
the prosecutor that he argued were improper,2 with all but one objection being 
sustained. (Tr., p.299, Ls.18-24; p.323, L.20 - p.325, L.20.) 
Following his jury trial, Mr. Marmentini was convicted of felony DUl, 3 and 
received a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, suspended in favor of 
a period of seven years of probation. (R., p.104.) Mr. Marmentini filed a Notice of 
Appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., p.116.) 
2 These statements will be addressed in detail below. 
3 Mr. Marmentini was also charged with driving without privileges (R., p.37), a charge for 
which the jury found him not guilty. (R., p.104.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the State commit misconduct during closing arguments, thereby requiring 
that Mr. Marmentini's conviction be vacated? 
2. Was Mr. Marmentini deprived of his due process right to a fair trial by the 
prosecutor's misconduct in closing arguments? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Mr. Marmentini's Conviction Should Be Vacated Because The Prosecutor Committed 
Misconduct During Closing Arguments 
A. Introduction 
During closing arguments, the State made several statements to which defense 
counsel objected, with the district court sustaining all of the objections except for one. 
In light of the prosecutor's continued misconduct despite the district court's sustaining of 
all but one of defense counsel's objections, as well as the district court's error in 
overruling the remaining objection, Mr. Marmentini contends that this prosecutorial 
misconduct requires that his conviction be vacated. 
B. Mr. Marmentini's Conviction Should Be Vacated Because The Prosecutor 
Committed Misconduct During Closing Arguments 
Where a defendant demonstrates that prosecutorial misconduct has 
occurred, and such misconduct was followed by a contemporaneous 
objection by defense counsel, such error shall be reviewed for harmless 
error in accordance with Chapman. 4 
Where the defendant meets his initial burden of showing that a violation 
occurred, the State then has the burden of demonstrating to the appellate 
court beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not 
contribute to the jury's verdict. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010). 
The first instance of prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the prosecutor's 
initial closing argument, and involved the following exchange: 
[Prosecutor:] So, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, based on the 
evidence that's been presented here, I believe this 
defendant is guilty -
4 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
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[Defense:] 
THE COURT: 
[Defense:] 
THE COURT: 
(Tr., p.299, Ls.16-24.) 
Judge, we would object. The prosecutor's -
Sustained. 
-- belief is not relevant. 
Sustained. Improper to argue your personal beliefs. 
The remaining instances of prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the 
prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument, and involved the following exchange: 
[Prosecutor:] 
[Defense:] 
THE COURT: 
[Prosecutor:] 
[Defense:] 
THE COURT: 
[ P rosec uto r:] 
The State - I believe the State has another -we have 
two duties here. The prosecutor has two duties. I 
have a duty to represent the State of Idaho, the 
people of the State of Idaho to prosecute crimes that I 
believe have been committed. 
Judge, we would object. This is improper argument. 
You need to not refer to your belief. Just argue the 
evidence that was presented to the jury and 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those 
and application of the jury instructions to that 
evidence. 
The prosecutor also has another one, and that really 
is to the defendant. A duty that we have - that he has 
access to any information in the possession of the 
prosecutor that would exonerate him or that would 
assist in his defense. 
Judge, we are going to object. I don't know where 
this is going, but it's improper. 
Overruled. 
The office of the Boise County Prosecuting Attorney 
has provided all evidence that would assist this 
defendant in defending himself against these charges. 
I will just say one other thing. You have heard some 
testimony about the BAC not being administered until 
30 to 45 minutes after the defendant was stopped. 
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[Defense:] 
THE COURT: 
[Prosecutor:] 
I believe the argument that is being made was the 
BAC reading, though it's not a reading that was taken 
when the defendant was driving. Think about that. 
How could it possibly be - how could you take a 
reading of somebody driving? It has to occur after the 
stop. So, again, you saw the care that this county 
and this sheriff's department goes through to check 
their instruments, train their people to produce a 
reliable result when we get to a case like this when it 
comes before a jury. 
I believe we have -
Judge, this is improper bolstering. 
Well, again, I just heard the last comment, and the 
last comment is improper argument for the 
prosecution to make, interjecting your own personal 
beliefs, so I will sustain the objection to the closing 
argument on that and ask that you not refer to your 
beliefs. 
Thank you, Your Honor. I think at this point, then, I 
will conclude my remarks. Thank you. Thank you 
very much. 
(Tr., p.323, L.19 - p.325, L.23.) 
The prosecutorial misconduct set forth above falls into two categories: (1) the 
prosecutor's statements as to his personal beliefs that Mr. Marmentini is guilty and that 
the breath test evidence is reliable, and (2) the prosecutor's claim that it had provided 
any and all exculpatory evidence to Mr. Marmentini. All of the conduct in the first 
category resulted in objections that were sustained. The only conduct in the second 
category resulted in an objection that was overruled. As will be shown below, all of the 
challenged statements represent prosecutorial misconduct and constitute error that 
requires this Court to vacate Mr. Marmentini's conviction for felony DUI. 
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1. The Prosecutor's Statements As To His Personal Beliefs 
The first category of statements, consisting of the prosecutor's personal beliefs 
as to Mr. Marmentini's guilt and the reliability of the breath test evidence, constituted 
error because they involved the injection of the prosecutor's personal beliefs and 
opinions as to Mr. Marmentini's guilt and the reliability of evidence. As Idaho appellate 
courts have long held, "[c]losing arguments should not include counsel's personal 
opinions and beliefs about the credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of the 
accused." State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing, inter alia, State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003)). 
In State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108 (1979), the Supreme Court explained that it 
was improper for a prosecutor to inject his personal opinions regarding the guilt of the 
accused and the evidence presented mainly because "personal expressions by the 
prosecutor involve a form of unsworn, unchecked testimony, tend to exploit the 
influence of the office and undermine the objective detachment which should separate a 
lawyer from the case which he argues." Id. at 111. In support of its conclusion, the 
Garcia Court referred to the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice 
concerning the prosecutor's function, including the admonition that "[i]t is unprofessional 
conduct for the prosecutor to express his personal belief or opinion as to the truth or 
falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant." Id. at 110 (emphasis 
omitted). 
The misconduct at issue in Mr. Marmentini's case is just what the Idaho Supreme 
Court was concerned with in Garcia. Here, the prosecutor expressed his personal 
opinion as to the guilt of the defendant at least three times, even going so far as to 
invoke his "duty" to the people of the State of Idaho to prosecute people only for crimes 
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that "I believe have been committed." That specific instance represented the State's 
most transparent attempt to "exploit the influence of the office" of the prosecuting 
attorney with respect to its belief as to the guilt of Mr. Marmentini. 
Although the district court sustained all defense objections to the personal belief 
misconduct, Mr. l\llarmentini asserts that this Court should find that the district court's 
response was insufficient to cure the prejudice caused by the misconduct. In Phillips, 
the prosecuting attorney argued, in rebuttal closing, that the jury should be irritated and 
upset at Phillips for the defense that he offered. Id. at 85. The Court of Appeals, 
concluded that the prosecutor had committed misconduct, and held that the defendant's 
objection "should have been sustained and, at a minimum, the district court should have 
instructed the jury to disregard the statements and admonished the prosecutor to 
discontinue his line of argument." Id. at 87-88 (emphasis added). In this case, the 
district court should have instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's improper 
statements, and should have more strongly admonished the prosecutor in order to 
prevent him from committing additional misconduct. 
In the absence of a showing of harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt by the 
State, this objected-to error must result in a reversal of Mr. Marmentini's conviction for 
felony DUI. 
2. The Prosecutor's Statements Of Facts Not In Evidence And Indirectly 
Commenting On Silence 
The second category of statements, which consisted of the State's assertion that 
it owed a duty to Mr. Marmentini to disclose all exculpatory evidence and that it had 
done so represented prosecutorial misconduct because it involved arguing facts not in 
evidence and amounted to an indirect comment on Mr. Marmentini's decision not to 
testify. The district court erred when it overruled defense counsel's objection. 
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The State may not refer to facts not in evidence in making its closing argument. 
Phillips at 86 (citing State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166 (1980); State v. Martinez, 136 
Idaho 521, 525 (Ct. App. 2001 ); State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 565-66 (Ct. App. 2001 ); 
State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160, 169 (Ct. App. 1999)). Here, the prosecutor never 
presented any evidence that he had provided defense counsel with all exculpatory 
evidence prior to trial. Despite this absolute lack of evidence in support of this 
proposition, the State chose to argue such "facts," an argument that also implied 
Mr. Marmentini would have testified if exculpatory evidence existed. This amounted to 
an impermissible indirect comment on Mr. Marmentini's decision not to testify. See 
Phillips at 86 ("In a criminal case, a prosecutor may not directly or indirectly comment on 
a defendant's invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent, either at trial or 
before trial, for the purposes of inferring guilt.") (citation omitted). 
In the absence of a showing of harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt by the 
State, this objected-to error must result in a reversal of Mr. Marmentini's conviction for 
felony DUI. 
11. 
Mr. Marmentini Was Denied His Due Process Right To A Fair Trial By The Prosecutor's 
Misconduct In Closing Arguments 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "[n]o person 
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o state shall ... 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... " U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV. Additionally, the Idaho Constitution guarantees that, "[n]o person 
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." lo. CONST. 
9 
art. I, §13. Due process requires criminal trials to be fundamentally fair. 
Schwartzmillerv. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19,576 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1978). Prosecutorial 
misconduct may result in the denial of a fair trial. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 
(1987). 
Although it was addressing unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct, the Perry 
Court explained, 
[l]t is a violation of a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial 
for a prosecutor to attempt to have a jury reach its decision on any factor 
other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence 
admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn 
from that evidence. 
Perry at 225. 
The prosecutor's misconduct during closing arguments, set forth in detail above, 
amounted to an attempt to have the jury decide the case on factors other than the law 
as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial. Specifically, 
the State sought to have the jury decide the case based on the opinion of the 
prosecutor, the prestige of the prosecutor's office, and facts not in evidence, and by 
indirectly commenting on Mr. Marmentini's decision not to testify at trial. Because the 
misconduct was objected to, Mr. Marmentini does not need to demonstrate prejudice; 
rather the State must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that any error was harmless. 
With respect to the harmlessness analysis, it is worth noting that the jury 
acquitted Mr. Marmentini of one count, and, during deliberations, sent a note to the 
district court asking for "a copy of Idaho Code 18-8004(4)." (Tr., p.334, Ls.5-8.) I.C. § 
18-8004( 4) is the statute governing the standards and admissibility of evidence 
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concerning evidentiary testing for blood alcohol concentration.5 Id. These two factors 
indicate that the jury had real doubt as to the State's overall case, as well as with 
respect to the charge for which Mr. Marmentini was ultimately convicted. See Martinez 
at 526 (declining to find harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the fact that 
"Martinez was acquitted on count one and the jury was in disagreement on count two as 
reflected by the note sent to the district during the jury's deliberations"). 
Having demonstrated that the State's misconduct constituted error of 
constitutional magnitude to which he objected, and in the absence of a showing of 
harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt by the State, Mr. Marmentini is entitled to 
have his conviction for felony DUI vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Marmentini respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate the judgment of conviction for felony DUI, and remand this matter to the 
district court for a new trial. 
DATED this 26th day of April, 2011. 
PE~CERJ.HAH 
eputy State Appellate Public Defender 
\ .I 
\ / 
"","~-"~·*'-*°'"/' 
5 In his closing argument, defense counsel vigorously contested whether 
Mr. Marmentini's blood alcohol concentration was above .20 at the time that he was 
driving. Of the twenty-one pages of defense counsel's closing argument, the blood 
alcohol content issue occupies fifteen of them (Tr., p.300, L.9 - p.322, L.1 ), with 
defense counsel specifically arguing, "And there is an important distinction between just 
being intoxicated, .08 and .20 and excessive, over .20. The State did not prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Dan's BAC will go to .20 .... " (Tr., p.306, L.24 - p.307, L.2.) 
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